Free trade: why are economists and noneconomists so far apart? by William Poole
THE GAP
A 1990 survey of economists employed in the
United States found that more than 90 percent
generally agreed with the proposition that the use
of tariffs and import quotas reduced the average
standard of living.2 These results are somewhat
dated; however, most observers agree that “[t]he
consensus among mainstream economists on the
desirability of free trade remains almost universal.”3
I don’t have any data to report economists’ views
on particular trade disputes, but am willing to offer
the following assertion: In most specific cases, dis-
interested economists do not defend trade restriction.
By “disinterested economists” I mean economists
not hired by firms engaged in the particular disputes
and not employed by government agencies involved
in the disputes. 
If fact, I suspect that disinterested economists’
attitudes about specific disputes are even more
lopsided in favor of free trade than the 90 percent
who generally favor free trade policies. The reason
is that specific disputes almost always involve in a
pretty obvious way special favors to particular indus-
tries. In contrast, economists’ attitudes in general
are influenced by theoretical cases in which pro-
tection may make some sense. I do not want to try
to explain these theoretical cases here, but do want
to note that actual trade disputes rarely fit such
cases.
Let’s now consider attitudes held by the general
public. Public opinion polls reveal that the attitude
of the general public toward free trade is not simply
one of either being for free trade or for protection-
2 See Alston, Kearl, and Vaughan (1992).
3 See Mayda and Rodrik (2001, p. 1).
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F
ree trade—are you fer it or agin it? Why?
I’m sure that this audience knows that most
economists support free trade policies;
however, public support for these policies can be
characterized as lukewarm at best and certain
groups are adamantly opposed. It is not unusual
to hear the following reservations expressed about
trade: “Trade harms large segments of U.S. workers.”
“Trade degrades the environment.” “Trade exploits
poor countries.” We have all heard these criticisms
and lots of others. 
Many economists, including me, try to change
public attitudes by explaining the advantages of
free trade in speeches and articles intended to reach
a wide range of audiences. But, let’s face it: We are
not very successful in changing public attitudes.
Why, and how can we become more persuasive?
What I will explore today is the gap that separates
economists from the general public.1
I’ll first present some evidence on the gap
between economists and the general public on
attitudes toward trade. I’ll then outline two principles
that help to understand this gap and that help to
frame revealing questions when studying particular
disputes. Finally, I’ll offer a few suggestions on closing
the gap.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express are mine and do not necessarily
reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve
System. I thank my colleagues at the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis for their comments; Cletus Coughlin,
vice president in the Research Division, was espe-
cially helpful. However, I retain full responsibility
for errors.
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1 See Coughlin (2002) for additional discussion of this gap.
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4 Questions asking about free trade in principle
reveal support for free trade, albeit not as strong as
economists’. However, questions asking about free
trade in practice reveal strong reservations. That is,
when we get to specific trade disputes, public sup-
port for free trade tends to crumble, whereas econ-
omists rarely support trade restriction in specific
disputes.
A majority of Americans do support free trade
in principle. A February 2000 survey by the Pew
Research Center asked the following question: “In
general, do you think that free trade with other coun-
tries is good or bad for the United States?” “Good”
was the response of 64 percent of the respondents,
while “bad” was the response of 27 percent of the
respondents. The remaining 9 percent “did not
know.” The general public’s support for free trade
is, therefore, a good bit lower than economists’
support. 
Much evidence exists suggesting that the general
public understands the benefits from free trade in
terms of increased product selection, higher quality,
and lower prices. The Pew Research Center found
that 81 percent of the respondents said that it was
either “very good” or “somewhat good” that trade
makes available different products from different
parts of the world.5
Despite an intuitive understanding of many of
the benefits of free trade, the general public has
strong reservations about embracing such a policy.
One set of reservations concerns distributional
effects of trade. Workers are not seen as benefiting
from trade. Strong evidence exists indicating a per-
ception that the benefits of trade flow to businesses
and the wealthy, rather than to workers, and to those
abroad rather than to those in the United States. A
poll taken by the Gallup Organization in November
1999 found that 56 percent believed that increased
trade helped American companies, but that only
35 percent believed that increased trade helped
American workers. In fact, 59 percent believed that
trade hurts American workers. 
Related to concern about adverse distributional
effects of trade is the view that trade is disruptive.
Regardless of whether a sufficient number of new
jobs are created to compensate for the jobs lost,
many Americans are reluctant to support free trade
because trade causes painful adjustments for those
who lose their jobs even if they find new jobs rela-
tively quickly. The costs incurred by these workers
are not necessarily offset by the creation of new and
possibly better jobs.6
Especially noteworthy is that the sentiments of
poll respondents likely reflect altruism rather than
self-interest. First, only a small minority of Americans
perceive the effects of trade on themselves to be
negative. Second, Americans tend to view others as
more vulnerable to increasing trade than themselves.
Thus, it appears that the concern about the disrup-
tive effects of job loss is for others rather than for
themselves. 
The concern for workers appears to go beyond
U.S. borders. Based on a June 2002 survey conducted
by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, it is
clear that the majority of respondents—93 percent
to be exact—think that member countries in inter-
national trade agreements should be required to
maintain minimum standards for working condi-
tions. Both moral concerns for the foreign workers
and economic concerns for U.S. workers appear to
affect the respondents’ views.
Roughly three-quarters of the respondents to
an October 1999 survey by the Program on
International Policy Attitudes felt that the United
States has a moral obligation to attempt to ensure
that workers in foreign countries making goods for
the United States do not work in harsh or unsafe
conditions. Only 23 percent of the respondents felt
that the United States should not judge what working
conditions should be in another country. A country’s
national sovereignty was not viewed as a compelling
reason to remain silent. Moreover, the possibility
that trade expansion might improve working con-
ditions abroad, even if not to the point of matching
6 An October 1999 survey conducted by the Program on International
Policy Attitudes asked respondents to choose between the following
two statements. First: “Even if the new jobs that come from freer trade
pay higher wages, overall it is not worth all the disruption of people
losing their jobs.” Second: “It is better to have the higher paying jobs,
and the people who lost their jobs can eventually find new ones.” The
first statement was favored by 56 percent of the respondents, while
40 percent favored the latter statement.
4 A wealth of information on trade opinions can be found at the following
website maintained by the Program on International Policy Attitudes:
www.americans-world.org/digest/global_issues/intertrade/
trade-general.cfm.
5 Other polls find similar results. EPIC-MRA—a polling firm conducting
educational, political, industrial, and consumer market research
analysis—found large majorities agreeing that trade allows American
consumers to have a larger selection of goods to choose from (87
percent), improves the quality of American goods (80 percent), and
allows low-income families to buy many products that they might not
otherwise afford (74 percent). Polling by EPIC-MRA also found that
Americans expected that they would either be paying much more (24
percent) or somewhat more (37 percent) if they were able to buy only
American-made goods.
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conditions in the United States, was either not con-
sidered or ignored.
Additional results reveal a perception that coun-
tries that do not maintain minimum standards for
working conditions have an unfair advantage that
allows for the exploitation of workers and the pro-
duction of goods at unduly low cost. Here there is
concern about the jobs of American workers com-
peting with cheap imports. A related aspect of this
argument is that the respondents were not convinced
by arguments that forcing higher standards for work-
ing conditions in foreign countries might cause
elimination of jobs of extremely poor people abroad
who desperately need jobs.
Strong support exists for including standards
dealing with workplace health and safety, limitations
on child labor, the right to strike, the right to bargain
collectively, and minimum wages in trade agree-
ments. In addition, contrary to World Trade Organi-
zation principles, Americans support unilateral
decisions to bar the import of products made under
substandard working conditions. 
Besides the effects of increased trade on workers,
many Americans are concerned that trade adversely
affects the environment and that environmental
standards should be incorporated into trade agree-
ments. In a June 2002 poll by the Chicago Council
on Foreign Relations, 94 percent of the respondents
felt that member countries in international trade
agreements should be required to maintain minimum
standards for protecting the environment.7 Support
also exists for restricting the importation of goods
whose production damages the environment.8
On all these issues of protecting the environ-
ment, health and safety, wages and hours, working
conditions, and so forth, I suspect that poll results
reflect general concerns more than trade concerns
per se. In the absence of a specific setting that makes
the costs clear, respondents are not likely to favor
accepting weaker protections for the environment,
for example. Few Americans favor a world trading
system in which U.S. policies on environmental
and other conditions could be controlled by foreign
governments through their willingness to accept
goods exported by the United States. Nevertheless,
these frequently expressed sentiments indicating a
desire to apply U.S. standards to foreign producers
do affect U.S. positions in trade disputes.
WHY THE GAP? THE SIMULTANEITY
PRINCIPLE
Two principles, I believe, explain the gap
between the economist’s view and the public’s view
on trade. These are what I will call the “simultaneity
principle” and the “political-favors principle.” I’ll
discuss the first of these now and the second shortly.
The not very insightful or artful term “simultane-
ity principle” encompasses the economist’s case for
free trade. I’m using the term because economists
think about the economy through a model in which
outcomes in markets are determined together as a
consequence of the interactions among markets.
Such interactions are represented abstractly in a
mathematical model with many equations that must
be solved simultaneously.
“Simultaneity principle” sounds complicated,
and is meant to. I used to teach the introductory
macro course to economics majors and remember
well my struggle to explain the characteristics of
the basic Keynesian macro model with 10 equations
that had to be solved simultaneously. Teaching this
material required many hours of classroom time. I
could use the model to explain why, for example,
an effort by households to increase their saving
might have as the primary effect for a time a reduc-
tion in total employment, with the precise outcome
depending on the nature of monetary policy and
the degree of price flexibility. Many other exercises
explain counterintuitive outcomes—counterintuitive,
that is, until you have worked with the model long
enough to change your intuition. It is simply a fact
that the outcomes can be complicated to explain
when everything in the economy depends on every-
thing else. Indeed, in large models with scores of
7 Additional evidence supporting environmental standards in the con-
text of trade can be found in the results of a November 2000 poll by
Tarrance Group and Greenberg Quinlan Research. Respondents were
asked to choose which of the following two statements were closer to
their views. First: “Future trade agreements should contain safeguards
that require the United States and other countries to enforce strong
environmental protections, even if it limits trade.” Second: “Expanding
trade is critical to the U.S. economy and trade agreements are good
for our economy, even if they do not contain strong environmental
protections.” The majority of respondents, 62 percent, chose the first
statement as more closely reflecting their views, while only 22 percent
supported not linking trade and the environment in trade agreements.
8 An October 1999 Program on International Policy Attitudes survey
asked respondents which of the following statements they agreed with
the most. First: “Countries should be able to restrict the import of
products if they are produced in a way that damages the environment,
because protecting the environment is at least as important as trade.”
Second: “If countries can put up trade barriers against a product any
time they can come up with something they do not like about how it
is produced, pretty soon they will be putting up barriers right and left.
This will hurt the global economy and cost jobs.” Overwhelming sup-
port was found for the first statement, with 74 percent of the respon-




equations it can be difficult even for economists to
identify remote and indirect effects. Elaborate simu-
lation investigations are typically required when
the models are large and complex.
The economist’s case for free trade rests prima-
rily on the fact that imposing or removing trade
restrictions invariably helps some firms and people
and hurts others but with a positive net benefit for
the country as a whole from moving toward freer
trade. As I emphasized in a speech in November
2003, a key reason why the general public is reluc-
tant to embrace free trade is that many do not
understand the benefits.9 And the reason people
do not understand the benefits is that they do not
understand the interactions and connections across
markets. For one example, people may see the gen-
uine costs imposed on workers who lose their jobs
to imports, but fail to see the benefits to consumers
of lower-priced goods from abroad. 
Economists are trained from their first course
in the subject to understand the interactions across
markets. The interactions are numerous and some-
times remote from the initial disturbance that sets
off a chain of such interactions. It is usually possi-
ble to explain the nature of these effects to non-
economists, and formal statistical studies can often
yield estimates of the magnitude of effects.
Sometimes, an interaction is pretty obvious
and it may not be difficult to convey the point. For
example, restricting imports of a raw material will
have positive effects on domestic producers of the
raw material, and their employees, but will hurt
domestic users of the raw material. Indeed, by
forcing up the price of the raw material, domestic
producers of the finished product may find them-
selves at a competitive disadvantage to foreign com-
panies with a cheaper source of the raw material.
Thus, saving jobs in the industry producing the
raw material comes at the cost of reduced jobs in
industries using the raw material and higher costs
to consumers of the finished product.
Most journalists want to smoke out all sides of
a story. In the case of a story involving a trade dis-
pute, smoking out the indirect effects is critical to
explaining all sides of the story. Understanding the
simultaneity principle leads immediately to ques-
tions about possible indirect and remote effects of
trade restrictions. Those questions need to be
addressed to economists and industry experts who
can uncover the connections across markets and
the indirect effects of trade restrictions.
It is important to recognize that the case for free
international trade is really part of a more general
case for free markets. The analysis of interregional
trade within a country is in most respects exactly the
same as the analysis of international trade. Inter-
national trade is a separate subject within economics
primarily because it deals with restrictions on trade
that do not ordinarily exist between regions of a
country.
Economic restrictions are of two sorts—restric-
tions on trade in goods and services and restrictions
on movement of factors of production. In today’s
world, the most severe of these restrictions is on
the movement of labor. Migration across national
borders is controlled almost everywhere, and capital
mobility is in many cases subject to some degree
of restriction. 
Although trade is generally free across state
borders within the United States, some restrictions
do exist. In making the case for free international
trade, it is sometimes helpful to refer to analogies
created by restrictions within the United States. One
example is state professional licensing requirements
that prevent doctors, lawyers, and barbers from
practicing in states where they are not licensed.
Another is regulation of taxis, which may prevent
taxis licensed in one jurisdiction from picking up
passengers at airports in other jurisdictions. This
restriction creates the inefficiency of a taxicab going
one way empty, even when potential passengers
are waiting in a long line for a taxi. Such examples
can be multiplied many times over, and are often
useful in explaining the nature of inefficiencies
created by trade restrictions.
One of the most difficult interactions to explain
is the connection between imports and exports. Even
though a country can attract capital for a time—
perhaps for a period measured in decades—in the
long run, imports must be paid for by exports. Most
people understand this point, but not the same point
put the other way—exports require imports. Restric-
tions on certain imports lead, quickly or eventually,
either to increases in other imports or decreases in
exports. This point is extremely important, for it
means that “saving jobs” by restricting imports saves
only jobs in the particular protected industry. Saving
such jobs necessarily means losing jobs in other
import-competing industries or in export industries. 
Consequently, one of the points economists
emphasize over and over is that saving jobs in partic-
9 The speech was presented to the Louisville Society of Financial
Analysts in Louisville, Kentucky, on November 19, 2003. It was pub-
lished in the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, March/April
2004, 86(2), pp. 1-7.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS Poole
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ular industries does not save employment for the
economy as a whole. Economists are sometimes
charged with insensitivity over job losses, when in
fact most of us are extremely sensitive to such losses.
What good economics tells us is that saving jobs in
one industry does not save jobs in the economy as
a whole. We urge people to be as sensitive to the
jobs indirectly lost as a consequence of trade restric-
tion as to those lost as a consequence of changing
trade patterns. Indirect job loss is part of the story
of trade restriction and can be smoked out if journal-
ists will consult knowledgeable experts.
I’ve already emphasized that the case for free
trade is really part of the case for free, competitive
markets more generally. This fact opens up another
avenue for informative coverage of trade issues.
Why should we be more concerned about job losses
from international trade than we are about job losses
from domestic competition or changing technology?
Outsourcing has been an issue recently. Some firms
have replaced staff handling phone inquiries with
staff abroad; other firms have replaced call-center
staff with automated message systems. Is it better
for the caller to be able to talk with a person, who
may be abroad, or to go through endless menus of
the form, “press 1 if you are a retail customer, press
2 if you are a wholesale customer, press 3 if …”?
When I go through these menus, I’m usually looking
for “press 4 to transfer to our competitor.” 
WHY THE GAP? THE POLITICAL-FAVORS
PRINCIPLE
Trade restriction requires legislative intervention,
or regulatory intervention authorized by legislation.
That means that trade restriction is inherently
political. I do not mean to use “political” in a pejora-
tive sense, for politics is an essential part of democ-
racy and democracy is an essential part of liberty.
Legislation involving economic issues typically
creates gains for some and losses for others. Every
legislator is aware of this fact. Legislation is typically
drawn in such a way to minimize the visibility of
the losses, to avoid creating resistance to the legis-
lation and lost votes. Legislation is often drawn to
increase the visibility of the gains to those who bene-
fit, to attract votes. However, sometimes legislation
hides the benefits, to reduce the possibility that
publicity will lead to opposition. Those who benefit,
of course, may be well aware of the benefit. It is
perfectly natural that legislators should write legis-
lation this way. You and I would do the same thing
if we were legislators.
Because they understand the importance of the
political-favors principle, journalists know imme-
diately what sorts of questions to ask. When evalu-
ating a particular trade restriction, who gains and
who loses? What is the net for the economy as a
whole of the gains and losses?
When I read a story that reports only the benefits
of trade restriction, I know the story is incomplete.
I also know that losers from restriction often do not
realize they’ve been hurt. I’m reminded of the story
some years ago of a bank employee who found a
way to skim fractional interest payments into his
own account. The depositor didn’t realize that his
account had been rounded off to $308.27 whereas
his account really had $308.274. The extra 4 tenths
of a cent, if left in the account, would have earned
interest and have led to a larger account balance in
the future. The accountant who skimmed a few
tenths of a cent from thousands of accounts put a
lot into his own account, until he got caught. Many
trade restrictions work this way—they cost con-
sumers just a little, but add up to a lot for the pro-
tected industry.
Perhaps there is no reason to feel much outrage
about such trade restriction, but in most cases legis-
lators would not be able to impose a small sales tax
on the good and funnel the revenues to the favored
industry. The stratagem works when it is hidden.
Telling the full story of any particular trade restriction
may require adding up lots of pennies extracted
from those who do not realize they are paying.
CLOSING THE GAP
Once the reasons for the gap between econ-
omists and noneconomists are understood,
approaches to closing the gap become clear. I’ve
already emphasized the important role of journalists.
In this area, as with all other public policy areas in
a democracy, a free and enterprising press is essen-
tial to effective government in the interest of the
nation at large.
As a former university professor, it is natural
for me to believe that formal education plays an
important role. Nevertheless, every educator is
aware of the short half-life of much of the material
taught. Students’ knowledge usually peaks at exam
time, and then starts to decay. What I hope my stu-
dents retained is some very basic principles, such
as the gains from voluntary exchange, and respect
for economics as a discipline. Years after formal
study, people need to be reminded of the analysis
and how it applies to real-life policy issues. Educators
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can play a continuing role, by writing and speaking
for noneconomist audiences.
But I began this speech by expressing disappoint-
ment over the effectiveness of economists’ speeches,
and that is why I’m emphasizing the importance of
the role of the press today. I’ve suggested that every
story on trade issues, to be complete, must explore
who gains, who loses, and the net of gains and losses
for the nation as a whole. 
Whenever faced with a policy choice that creates
winners and losers, we face the difficult problem
of somehow weighting one person’s benefit against
another’s loss. The issue appears constantly, and
we take two general approaches. The first is that
the government does not take property without
compensation. The second is that the government
stands aside from the competitive market system
and lets the chips fall as they may. 
Government provides compensation when it
takes land for a highway. It is important to note,
however, that the compensation is an estimate of
fair market value. We understand the loss to a family
when government takes land that has been in the
family for generations, but we do not try to com-
pensate for the sentimental value of the land. It is
simply not possible to maintain a vigorous, growing
economy while giving great weight and actual com-
pensation for loss of sentimental value. 
Government provides generalized compensa-
tion, or adjustment assistance, through unemploy-
ment insurance. The United States does not have a
general program to compensate owners of capital.
Unemployment assistance is relatively limited, as
it must be to retain incentives to return to work.
Existing legislation also provides some extra benefits
for adjustment to losses arising from international
trade. My view of this legislation is that in the abstract
there is no particular reason to provide more assis-
tance for job loss due to international trade than
for any other reason, but as a practical matter such
assistance is warranted if it helps to gain acceptance
for trade liberalization. We should recognize that
many of the arguments for maintaining certain
industries in the United States are essentially senti-
mental, the case being essentially the same as that
for avoiding taking land that has been the family
farm for generations.
We live in a society that on the whole accepts
an economic system that lets the chips fall where
they may. Some decry the nature of this system, but
its general support rests on the progress and the
higher standard of living it affords. We should not
underestimate the individual protections built into
this system. Our sophisticated market system
includes insurance markets that permit individuals
and firms to protect themselves against many forms
of risk. More importantly, the vitality of our markets
creates opportunities for new firms and new employ-
ment to absorb those displaced by changing com-
petitive conditions. Our dynamic economic system,
and not restrictive trade legislation, provides the
best protection for our citizens.
THE BOTTOM LINE
We all know that a vigorous and just democracy
depends on a free and enterprising press. I urge you
to keep my two principles—the simultaneity prin-
ciple and the political-favors principle—in mind
when reporting on trade issues. The first requires
that you identify the complicated and indirect effects
of trade restrictions, and the second requires that
you understand the winners and losers from restric-
tions. I believe that the general voting public will be
more likely to favor free trade policies if it under-
stands the issues at a deeper level.
So remember: Every trade story requires at least
three sections. One reports who gains, one reports
who loses, and one reports the net of the gains and
losses for the country as a whole. There is an enor-
mous opportunity here: Sound and impartial report-
ing case by case by case will do more, I believe, to
promote free trade policies than all the economists’
speeches extolling the benefits of trade laid end to
end.
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